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The efficient market hypothesis would suggest that stock prices incorporate the 
information revealed in the public process of creating legislation as the debate 
occurred. Thus, there should be no abnormal returns to agribusiness stocks on key 
legislative dates when drafting and altering the farm bill. Using an event study 
methodology, key legislative dates are tested for abnormal returns to firms that 
supply inputs to or process outputs of agricultural producers. Typically, agri-
businesses react on the date legislation emerges from the joint House and Senate 
conference committee. 
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The economic impacts of U.S. farm policy are not limited to producers and 
producer groups. Instead, these impacts are far-reaching and have significant 
effects on economic sectors having direct ties to production agriculture (Schmitz, 
Furtan, and Baylis, 2002). Theoretically, farm policy programs that induce more 
agricultural production increase the profitability of both suppliers of inputs to 
production agriculture and buyers of production agriculture’s outputs. However, 
these theories seem to be at odds with the group of agribusiness firms that lobbied 
for more open markets and reduced government subsidies in the negotiations 
surrounding the 1996 Farm Bill (Schertz and Doering, 1999). 
  This relationship between agricultural policy, input suppliers, and food market-
ers’ profitability, in combination with the decline in total food and agricultural 
value provided by production, may be partially responsible for input suppliers and 
food marketers becoming more actively involved in the U.S. Farm Bill legislative 
process through lobbying efforts (Ndayisenga and Kinsey, 1999). Indeed, only 
recently has the agricultural economics’ literature begun to investigate the relation-
ship between policy and input suppliers and food marketers. Arguably, Schertz 
and Doering (1999) make the most compelling case concerning this relationship. 
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In particular, they discuss a report released by a consulting firm that gave support 
to lobbying efforts which were successful in removing certain government subsi-
dies. Agribusiness companies sponsored the report, raising a speculation that they 
stood to gain from the removal of agricultural subsidies. 
  The objective of this study is to assess how the market revalued publicly traded 
agribusiness stocks during farm policy announcements. Using an event study 
analysis, we examine the impact of seven previous U.S. farm bills, dating back to 
1973, on the market value of several publicly traded input suppliers and food 
marketers. Since an event study is used, a set of logical announcement dates are 
necessary. We employ the farm bill procedural dates for the following events: the 
introduction of the bill in a chamber, the emergence of the bill from the joint 
House and Senate conference committee and the announcement of the conference 
report in a chamber, and the signing of the bill into law by the President. One 
might not anticipate any significant changes in the market value of these input 
suppliers and food marketers when lawmakers announce farm policy changes 
because agribusiness firms are involved in the process. Significant movements in 
market values, however, would provide evidence of the market’s reaction to the 
new information and potentially influence input suppliers differently than food 
marketers. 
  Our results show that past U.S. farm bills do affect the stock value of agri-
business firms on these three dates, but in particular on the date the bill emerges 
from the joint conference committee and the conference report is announced in a 
chamber. This finding suggests the market incorporates the newly available 
public information on this date. Thus, the market exhibits semi-strong form effici-
ency, a form of pricing efficiency where the price of the security fully reflects all 
public information. Specifically, only information that is not publicly available 
can benefit investors seeking to earn abnormal returns on investments. As the 
financial markets receive additional information (e.g., one-time bailouts in the 
case of bad weather), the results of the short-term analysis will not be sustained. 
This does not diminish the importance of how the market views the information 
on and around this date because swings in market values influence the firm, 
investors, and special-interest groups. In particular, our results indicate that the 
market values of agribusiness firms that are food marketers, processors, or 
handlers of farm commodities (i.e., after-farm-gate agribusiness firms) are signifi-
cantly impacted by the new market information, while all other agribusiness firms 
(i.e., before-farm-gate agribusiness firms) are not. 
 
Legislative Process and a Brief Overview of Farm Bills 
The policy tools used in U.S. agricultural legislation have varied over time 
because policy makers design legislation to respond to timely issues and the 
results of previous farm bills. The legislative process, however, is long and filled 
with many public discussions of a bill’s progress on its way to becoming law. 












 Table 1. Estimation Period and Major Legislative Action Dates by U.S.  
 Farm Bill 
 
  U.S. Farm Bill 
Event  1973  1977 1981 1985 1990 1996 2002 
 Estimation Period Beginning Date: 
 4/24/72  12/22/75  3/11/80  3/20/85 6/9/89 12/8/94  6/28/00 
 Estimation Period Ending Date: 
 4/24/73  12/17/76  3/9/81  3/18/86 6/6/90 12/5/95  6/26/01 















 Conference Report Filed: 
   6/8/73












 Bill Signed by the President: 
 8/10/73  9/29/76  12/22/81  12/23/86 11/28/90  4/4/96  5/13/02 
Source: Library of Congress THOMAS website (2006). 
Notes: The estimation period is the period used for running the market model regressions. Letters in brackets 
denote chamber of Congress (H = House of Representatives, S = Senate). 
a No conference report filed; date used is date passed/agreed to in Senate. 
 
a result, the a priori hypothesis is that as the U.S. farm bills move through the 
legislative process, no abnormal returns should accrue to the market values of 
agribusiness firms on procedural dates. To test this hypothesis, we consider seven 
farm bills and their impact on a large sample of firms in many sectors of the 
agribusiness classification and on logical farm bill procedural dates. 
  The major legislative actions of a U.S. farm bill provide a set of dates to 
consider for the announcement date in this study (table 1). First, senators on the 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee and representatives on the House 
Committee on Agriculture begin debate on agricultural policy separately. The 
first committee to introduce an initial bill into its respective chamber for debate 
signals the event identified as “bill introduced” in table 1. Once the House of 
Representatives and the Senate each pass a bill by majority vote, a joint House 
and Senate conference committee is formed to reconcile portions of each bill that 
are in conflict. This committee then files the amended bill in either the House or 
Senate, which is the event date denoted “conference report filed” in table 1. 
Finally, the President signs the legislation for it to become public law. Indeed, 
these are only the formal hearings on U.S. farm bill legislation, and discussion 
and debate of policy begin long before the “bill introduced” stage. This public 
dialogue is another reason to believe that on these procedural dates, abnor-












abnormal returns exist, a discussion of the public dialogue surrounding the seven 
farm bills is warranted to provide insights into the legislative process. 
Brief Overview of Farm Bills—1973 to 2002 
The following discussion provides a brief description of what legislation was 
included in each of the seven farm bills in question and what actually occurred 
because of the farm bill. Summary information on the U.S. farm bills, highlighted 
below, is taken from the following sources: Cochrane and Ryan (1976); Cochrane 
and Runge (1992); Dicks (1998); Gardner (2002); Johnson and Ericksen (1977); 
Johnson et al. (1982); Manchester, Langley, and Stucker (1985); Orden, Paarl-
berg, and Roe (1999); Paarlberg (1964); Schertz and Doering (1999); Shaik, 
Helmers, and Atwood (2005); and Westcott, Young, and Price (2002). 
  The first farm bill considered is the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act 
of 1973. This farm bill was the first to have titles on commodity programs, trade, 
rural development, farm credit, conservation, agricultural research, food and 
nutrition programs, and marketing programs. In addition, target prices and 
deficiency payments were established and wheat and cotton quota programs were 
suspended. 
  Leading into the debate on the second farm bill in 1977, the agricultural econ-
omy was booming. Thus, the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 raised support 
prices, which were tied to costs of production and target prices. Target prices 
were raised above loan rates because the target prices would provide cover to 
rising costs while the loan rates would not provide too high a price floor. 
  The Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 (farm bill number three) was in part a 
continuation of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977. Loan programs for quali-
fying commodities (such as wheat, feed grains, sugar, and dairy) were main-
tained, and specific target prices for wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, and rice 
were set to steadily increase each year until 1985. 
  Many significant events occurred between the 1981 and 1985 U.S. farm bills: 
government expenditures on commodity programs increased from an annual 
average of less than $2 billion to over $12 billion, farmland values rapidly 
declined, the farm financial crisis worsened, and stocks of commodities increased 
due to payment-in-kind program payments and trade embargos. Because of these 
events, the fourth farm bill, the Food and Security Act of 1985, lowered target 
prices, froze program yields, and decoupled government payments from 
agriculture production decisions. Although this farm bill contained provisions that 
set the stage for an unsubsidized agriculture, a commitment to aid financially 
stressed farmers remained through favorable deficiency payments and increased 
global competitiveness. 
  Leading into the 1990 U.S. farm bill debate (farm bill number five), the agri-
cultural environment was positive. Farm prices and incomes were up, while gov-
ernment outlays to agriculture were down. Therefore, legislators generally viewed 












Trade Act of 1990 made few alterations to agriculture policy. Many policy 
analysts touted the 1990 farm bill as being the last of a long line of “conventional 
farm bills,” or the last farm bill with price supports and loan programs. 
  In 1996, the legislature passed the sixth farm bill considered in this study. This 
bill is widely referred to as “Freedom to Farm.” The Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 had stated objectives to achieve an 
unsubsidized, “free-market” agriculture by 2002. The government wanted to 
spend less on agriculture, and farmers wanted to be able to produce commodities 
being demanded in the marketplace. 
  The 1996 bill was supposed to provide a transition period that would lead the 
way to a government-free U.S. agriculture sector and acclimate U.S. farmers to 
the global market. Yet, this was not the result. In actuality, U.S. farms could not 
compete or survive at the world’s market prices because of the high costs of 
production (labor and land). Between 1998 and 2001, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture paid out more than $26 billion in emergency relief payments. 
Although these payments were largely due to crop losses and low commodity 
prices, many considered the 1996 farm bill—which had moved toward an unsub-
sidized agriculture—to be responsible for creating an environment where the 
government would have to remit substantial relief payments if a disaster occurred. 
Largely due to this situation, the seventh and final farm bill, the 2002 Farm 
Security and Rural Investment Act, focused on safety net programs, risk manage-
ment, conservation program expansion, and more efficient trade provisions. 
Event Study Methodology 
To identify the impact that U.S. farm bills have had on agribusinesses, we use an 
event study methodology following Campbell, Lo, and MacKinley (1997). The 
purpose of an event study is to examine stock price behavior around the 
announcement of an event and the influence the announcement has on the 
environment in which a firm operates (Binder, 1998). Event studies create a 
“control period,” which occurs prior to the announcement date of the event. The 
control period used here follows Armitage’s (1995) recommendation of 250 
trading days, or one calendar year. During these dates, an OLS market model is 
estimated by regressing stock returns for a firm on the rate of return for the 
market. Using this model, abnormal returns are identified in the event period or 
event window—those dates surrounding the event announcement. To avoid 
biased parameter estimates attributed to the disturbance in the regression model, 
the two periods do not overlap (Binder). 
  The event window should involve small intervals surrounding and including the 
event date. Armitage (1995) states that two-day event windows are common 
when the announcement date can be determined with certainty. The computation 
of abnormal returns for each farm bill in this study is done for the following three 
event windows: T = [−5, +5], T = [−2, +2], and T = [−1, +1]. Negative numbers in 












numbers are days after the announcement date. The event windows extend 
beyond the announcement date because, as noted by Senchack and Starks (1993), 
this accounts for information leakage. 
  Abnormal returns are calculated for a given trading day during these event 
windows by subtracting the actual stock return from the OLS market model 
predicted stock return. Because the event date is common across all firms, the 
stocks’ abnormal returns may be cross-sectionally dependent. This problem is 
corrected by averaging the abnormal returns across all firms in the event study for 
a given farm bill. Averaging the abnormal returns also minimizes the effects of 
any unexpected events that might influence a single firm’s share value, and these 
averages provide a more accurate representation of the true effects of the 
announcement of a farm bill on firm values. From these average abnormal 
returns, a cumulative average abnormal return is calculated for the event window 
under consideration. This process involves summing all average abnormal returns 
during the event window. 
  When aggregating abnormal returns across an event date, the potential for serial 
correlation exists because the abnormal returns for each firm’s share value are 
functions of the same market model intercept and slope estimators (Cowan, 
2005). Salinger (1992) cautions that ignoring serial correlation when all firms 
experience the same event date can lead to serious errors in the results irrespec-
tive of the length of the event window. Therefore, the corrected Patell test statistic 
is used to test for the presence of abnormal returns because it corrects for serial 
correlation (Mikkelson and Partch, 1988). With the corrected Patell test there is 
no presumed dependence in the true market model error term, but the serial 
dependence occurs because all of the abnormal return estimators, being cumu-
lative, are functions of the same estimators of the market model parameters 
(Cowan, 2005). The correction for the Patell test affects only windows and not 
single-period test statistics. 
  A nonparametric generalized sign test is used to test the fraction of firms who 
exhibit a positive abnormal return. This test does not require the assumption of 
normality implied by the average abnormal returns and does not require the 
restrictive assumption that 50% of the sample has a positive return (Campbell, 
Lo, and MacKinley, 1997). The test uses the normal approximation to the 
binomial distribution. The null hypothesis for the generalized sign test is that the 
fraction of positive returns is the same as in the estimation period (Cowan, 2005). 
The generalized sign test is well specified and powerful under a variety of 
conditions, and it is robust to variance increases on the event date (Cowan, 1992). 
Appendix A contains the derivation of the corrected Patell test and the non-
parametric generalized sign test. 
  The event study analysis in this study is implemented using the software 
package Eventus. This event studies software package follows the event study 
methodology discussed above, and it retrieves the data used in this analysis from 













The USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) (2006) provides a listing of 
industries closely tied to production agriculture by Standard Industrial Classi-
fication (SIC) code. SIC codes aggregate industries into related groups: farm 
production; agricultural services, forestry, and fishing; agricultural input 
industries; agricultural processing and marketing industries; wholesale and retail 
trade of agricultural products; and indirect agribusinesses. ERS defines farm and 
farm-related industries as those industries generally having 50% or more of their 
national work force employed in providing goods and services necessary to 
satisfy the final demand for agricultural products. For the purposes of this study, 
firms in apparel and textiles, leather products and footwear, and packaging are 
omitted. Firms in these industries are not first processors/handlers of agricultural 
commodities. Thus, they are not part of the population of firms under consider-
ation in this analysis.
1 
  For a stock to be eligible for inclusion in the study of an individual farm bill, 
the stock must have daily return data in the CRSP database and must have data 
for 250 trading days prior to the announcement date of the introduction of the bill 
into a chamber and 20 trading days after the announcement date of the President 
signing the farm bill. Daily returns provide a more accurate measure of market 
efficiency than monthly returns (MacKinley, 1997; Henderson, 1990; Armitage, 
1995). Any agribusiness firm that did not have daily return data for the afore-
mentioned dates was excluded from the choice set of agribusiness stocks used in 
testing for abnormal returns for a given farm bill. The process is the same for all 
farm bills examined in this study. 
  Appendix B provides a representative sample listing of the agribusiness firms 
used in the event study analysis. In addition, the appendix segments the represent-
ative sample into two distinct agribusiness groups. Agribusinesses that are neither 
handlers nor processors of farm commodities are termed “before farm gate,” and 
agribusinesses that are handlers or processors of farm commodities are denoted 
“after farm gate.” By segmenting the agribusiness firms, additional insights can 
be gained on the short-run impacts of farm bills on a firm’s stock price given its 
relative location to the farm gate. 
Empirical Results 
The seven most recent farm bills and their impact on agribusiness shareholder 
values are tested via an event study methodology. Multiple event dates are 
tested; however, the contention is that when the conference report is filed, all 
                                                           
1 One sector not included under the ERS SIC classification is lenders. This sector, or at least a portion of this 
sector, might be impacted by the introduction of a new farm bill, specifically those who lend to agriculture 
producers, input suppliers, and processors of agriculture commodities. As a result, the sample includes publicly 
traded lenders who are among the top 10 lending institutions in total agriculture loans in dollars to production 












information regarding that particular farm bill is known. Because this can be 
construed as leakage of information, the cumulative average abnormal returns are 
reported. 
Impact on Agribusiness Stock Values: Conference Report Filed Date 
When one considers the 10 days around the date a conference report is filed within 
a chamber of Congress, statistically significant abnormal returns to agribusiness 
stock values occur for four of the seven bills considered (table 2). This finding 
suggests the market quickly incorporates new agricultural legislation information 
into stock values of input suppliers and first handlers/processors. Over the period 
spanning five days pre- and five days post-filing of the conference report for the 
1973 farm bill, statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns of 1.05% 
occur. Of the 119 firms in the sample during that period, 66 firms (55%) gener-
ated positive abnormal returns. These firms generating positive returns during the 
estimation period were not statistically significant. However, during the shorter 
event intervals, a larger percentage of firms had positive returns that were 
statistically significant. The 1973 bill marked a break from high loan rates, land 
retirement, and reduced exports of earlier bills. In addition, excess stocks had 
been reduced and the certificate system where marketers had to buy domestic and 
export certificates was replaced by a direct payment to farmers, so the U.S. 
government picked up the support instead of marketers. Finally, the loan rate was 
reduced to stimulate exports. 
  In addition to the 1973 farm bill, agribusiness stock values also experienced 
positive cumulative average abnormal returns on the days around the date the 
conference report was filed in 1981 and 1985. Each of these bills contained 
provisions that would serve as the basis for the presence of positive abnormal 
returns, if the market had not already incorporated this information. The 1981 bill 
had many provisions and discussion points which would signal positive returns to 
agribusiness. Congress wanted to compensate farmers for President Carter’s 
embargo of the Soviet Union. Second, the forecasts were for the high and rising 
exports and prices of the 1970s to continue into the 1980s. All of these elements 
would have been positive for agribusiness, and ultimately increase stock value. 
Yet in retrospect, these beliefs and the associated policy changes implemented 
were the very factors that caused the 1981 farm bill to be viewed as a failure. For 
example, only 32% of agribusiness operators wanted a continuation of the 1981 
farm bill (Zulauf, Guither, and Henderson, 1987). The 1985 bill initiated 
numerous reforms, which would help to increase agribusiness firms’ values. This 
bill marked a concerted effort by policy makers to expand the export market and 
more closely paralleled the views of agribusiness operators and operators of 
medium-to-large-sized farms than the views of operators of small-to-medium-
sized farms. 
  Alternatively, the results suggest that agribusiness companies’ stock values 












Table 2. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and the Percentage of Firms 
with Positive Abnormal Returns Over Select Event Intervals Around the Date 






















2002  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1996  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1990  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1985  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1981  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1977  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1973  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. The statistical test for the cumulative average abnormal returns is the corrected 
Patell (1976) test; the statistical test for the percent of firms with positive abnormal returns is the non-
parametric generalized sign test. 
 
filed in 1996. These results appear perplexing at first. The removal of target 
prices was not seen as important because of the growing world demand, which 
should have been enough to keep prices high. Thus, the increasing export market 
was expected to make both farmers and agribusiness firms more profitable, which 
in turn meant the income and price supports would not be utilized. In addition, 
farmers were still eligible to receive direct payments. The direct payments were 
expected to put more cash in farmers’ hands than the previous target price 
deficiency payments. Although the legislative process for the 1996 farm bill took 
just under three months to complete, the 1996 farm bill debate actually began in 












bill into law (Ray, 2001). This drawn-out legislative debate caused concern 
among those following the debate because a veto would have meant returning to 
the 1949 bill as the permanent agriculture legislation (Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe, 
1999). Potentially, this threat is the reason for, or at least contributed to, the 
abnormal returns on the conference report filing date for the 1996 Farm Bill. 
  The 2002 Farm Bill exhibits significant abnormal returns in the wider 10-day 
window, but does not have significant abnormal returns in the shorter 4- and 2-
day windows. The results associated with the 2002 Farm Bill are unique. It is 
important to note that the Conference Report was filed after the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. It is possible that the tragedy of 
September 11 could have contaminated the results pertaining to this particular 
farm bill if the events represented a dramatic change in the operating environment 
of agribusinesses. Nevertheless, the 2002 bill was a “big money grab” as agricul-
ture locked in spending based on what was an optimistic budget baseline, so the 
results are not surprising. For example, ethanol producers received extra subsidies 
to buy corn, plus the farm bill contained marketing loans and loan deficiency 
payments (LDPs, or demand subsidies). 
  The results do not lend support for significant abnormal returns around the 
introduction of the farm bill in 1990—a farm bill that represented minimal change 
in agricultural policy. The results of the 1977 farm bill show no abnormal returns 
as well. These findings suggest limited abnormal returns are evidence of no news. 
The reason for the lack of reaction is that there were limited changes in farm 
policy, and any market reaction to these policies had already occurred. Referring 
to forecasts of market conditions at the time, Cochrane and Runge (1992) argue 
that nobody expected the instruments of the 1977 bill to matter, since prices were 
high, exports were strong, and land values were high. Rising input costs could 
have been seen as a negative by the agribusiness industry, as there would be 
concerns about whether farmers would continue to purchase their products; 
however, provisions for rising input costs were included in the bill (Orden, 
Paarlberg, and Roe, 1999). Despite history’s later revelation that the forecasts 
were wrong, the market had already incorporated all of the information by the 
time the bill was introduced in conference. 
 
Impact on Agribusiness Stock Values: President Signed  
and Bill Introduced Dates 
 
It is noteworthy that the two farm bills without significant abnormal returns 
around the date the conference report was filed (1977 and 1990) both have 
significant abnormal returns on the date the President signed the legislation into 
law (table 3). It should also be noted that both of these farm bills waited longer 
than other farm bills for the President’s signature after passing both chambers of 
Congress. Perhaps the increased uneasiness regarding the President’s veto power 












Table 3. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and the Percentage of Firms 
with Positive Abnormal Returns Over Select Event Intervals Around the Date of 






















2002  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1996  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1990  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1985  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1981  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1977  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1973  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. The statistical test for the cumulative average abnormal returns is the corrected 
Patell (1976) test; the statistical test for the percent of firms with positive abnormal returns is the non-
parametric generalized sign test. 
 
  Only one farm bill (1990) did not have any significant abnormal returns around 
the date the bill was originally introduced into a chamber of Congress (table 4). 
As stated previously, the provisions in the 1990 farm bill represented minimal 
change from previous agricultural policy. Consequently, the market expected 
these policies to remain in effect and these expectations were realized. These 
results lend support to the argument that the bill as originally introduced does not 
contain the same information as the final piece of legislation. One might also 
conclude that the original draft of a farm bill is only a starting point from which 
lobbyists can begin to influence policy in an effort to create, at least in the short 












Table 4. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and the Percentage of Firms 
with Positive Abnormal Returns Over Select Event Intervals Around the Date 






















2002  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1996  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1990  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1985  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1981  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1977  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1973  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. The statistical test for the cumulative average abnormal returns is the corrected 
Patell (1976) test; the statistical test for the percent of firms with positive abnormal returns is the non-
parametric generalized sign test. 
 
Impact on Before-Farm-Gate and After-Farm-Gate Agribusinesses’  
Stock Values: Conference Report Filed Date 
 
Given an event study focuses on the short-term impacts of information on stock 
market values, we cannot make conjectures regarding the long-term sustainability 
of the results discussed above. Still, this does not imply our results are of little 
importance, because price fluctuations do occur and impact firms, investors, and 
special-interest groups. Up to this point, our results reveal that all agribusiness 
firms considered in this study are impacted by new policy information being 












firms is segmented? The results discussed in this section indicate that a difference 
across types of agribusiness firms exists. 
  Table 5 reports the event study results around the date a conference report 
is  filed in a chamber for two types of agribusinesses: (a) input suppliers, 
nonprocessors, or nonhandlers of farm commodities (i.e., before-farm-gate 
agribusiness firms), and (b) food marketers, processors, or handlers of farm 
commodities (i.e., after-farm-gate agribusiness firms). Results presented in table 2 
are comparable to the results reported in table 5 because the same event date is 
considered. There are no striking differences between the results in tables 2 and 5 
except for the 1990 farm bill. Before-farm-gate agribusiness firms experienced a 
significant decrease of 1.42% in their market value during the 4-day event 
window, while after-farm-gate agribusiness firms and the entire agribusiness firm 
sample did not. Perhaps the introduction of flex acres in the 1990 farm bill caused 
some concern among input suppliers as to how farmers would react to planting 
flexibility. 
  A strong similarity between tables 2 and 5 is that the after-farm-gate agribusi-
ness firms exhibit nearly identical results in terms of magnitude and significance 
relative to the entire sample. In general, the after-farm-gate agribusiness firms are 
impacted the most when the conference report is filed in a chamber. One 
deviation from the relatively larger impact of the announcement on after-farm-
gate firms relative to before-farm-gate firms is noted in the 1981 farm bill for the 
10-day event window. Before-farm-gate agribusiness firms enjoyed a larger 
increase in their stock value (2.36%) compared to their counterparts (1.02%). 
This larger increase may be due to the announcement of a steady increase in 
commodity target price. This announcement might have signaled to investors that 
farmers will have a more stable disposable income, thereby allowing them to 




This paper has examined the impact of the announcement of major U.S. farm bills 
on agribusiness stock values over the last 30 years. The results confirm that stock 
values of agribusinesses have reacted to these major U.S. farm bills. Typically, 
agribusinesses react on the date legislation emerges from the joint House and 
Senate conference committee. Of the seven farm bills considered, results revealed 
only one, the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (also 
known as the Freedom to Farm Act), had a consistent and significantly negative 
abnormal impact on agribusiness stock values on all three event dates considered. 
This finding might reflect a short-term view by investors in the market, where 
investors were anticipating near-term declines in value. Another reason might be 
the shift by investors of their investments to other sectors of the economy because 
of the increased variability in agribusiness sector returns. The impact on share-
holder value tended to be quite small in percentage terms—typically less than 2%. 












Table 5. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns and the Percentage of Firms 
with Positive Abnormal Returns Over Select Event Intervals Around the Date 
Conference Report Filed in a Chamber: Input Suppliers and Food Marketers 
 
 B EFORE FARM GATE 





















2002  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1996  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1990  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1985  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1981  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1977  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1973  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. The statistical test for the cumulative average abnormal returns is the corrected 
Patell (1976) test; the statistical test for the percent of firms with positive abnormal returns is the non-
parametric generalized sign test.                                                                                   
( extended . . .  → )
 
into substantial gains or losses in value. For example, a shift of 2% on a $1 billion 
firm results in a loss or gain of $20 million. 
  Although we cannot comment as to how specific provisions in a farm bill affect 
stock values of agribusiness firms, we do know there is an impact in the financial 
markets when new information about farm policy is made public. We can state 
that over the past 30 years there has been a difference between the market’s 
expectations about what farm policy will be in the United States and the 
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2002  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1996  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1990  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1985  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1981  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1977  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 










1973  −5 to +5 
−2 to +2 












formation of groups like the Coalition for a Competitive Food and Agricultural 
System, a consortium of agribusiness leaders—i.e., agribusiness firms realize that 
U.S. farm policies affect agricultural financial markets. 
  Moreover, the results of this study indicate the need for further research into 
assessing how U.S. farm policy affects the value of agribusiness firms. We have 
demonstrated that before- and after-farm-gate agribusiness firms’ stock values are 
impacted differently. The next step would be to identify additional unique charac-
teristics of agribusiness firms that are more prone to be impacted by policy (e.g., 
size, subsector, location, and asset management characteristics), thereby helping 
to predict and develop a further understanding of how farm policy will affect the 
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Appendix A: Derivation of the Corrected Patell Test  
for Correlation of Abnormal Returns 
 
Following Mikkelson and Partch (1988), the corrected Patell test statistic for the null 
hypothesis that the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) equals 0 is calculated 
as: 
















   
 
where CAR is the cumulative abnormal return, F is the total number of firms in the 
sample, and s is the estimated standard deviation of the CAR during the T1 and T2 
event window for the fth firm  , 1 2 () . TT f f CAR  The s is the square root from the follow-
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where AR is the abnormal return estimated via the OLS market model, L is the length 
of the event period in trading days, M  is the number of non-missing trading day 
returns in the estimation period used to estimate the parameters for firm f, Rmt is the 
observed return on the equally weighted market index on day t, and RmEst is the mean 
market return over the estimation period. 
 
Derivation of the Nonparametric Generalized Sign Test 
 
The fraction of firms with positive abnormal returns in the estimation period (p) is 
calculated as follows: 
 










where F is the total number of firms, E is the number of days in the estimation period, 
and Cft is an indicator function that counts the number of positive returns for an 
individual firm (for example, Cft = 1 if ARft > 0, and 0 otherwise). 
     The generalized sign test statistic Z is calculated as: 
 
(A4)                               
1/2 ˆˆ ˆ () ( 1 ) , /[] GSZ j Fp Fp p    
 
where j represents the number of firms with positive abnormal returns on that day. 
When F is large, the distribution of GSZ is approximately normal by the central limit 
theorem. Thus, an approximate normal test can be constructed using the test statistic 
GSZ. 
 












 Appendix Table B1. A Representative Sample of Firms Included in the Study  
 
Before Farm Gate  
(nonprocessors of farm products) 
 After Farm Gate  
 (processors and handlers of farm products) 
Northwest Bancorp./Wells Fargo & Co. New  Newcourt Industires, Inc. 
N C N B Corp./Bank of America Corp.  Altria Group, Inc. 
First Banc Group Ohio, Inc./Bank One Corp.  Hormel Foods Corp. 
Cameron Finan. Corp./Wachovia Corp. 2nd New  Sara Lee Corp. 
Union Planters Corp.  Seaboard Corp. 
Federal Agricultural Mort. Corp.  Bob Evans Farms, Inc. 
Marshall & Ilsley Corp.  Bridgford Foods Corp. 
Pioneer Hi Bred International, Inc.  Cal Maine Foods, Inc. 
R D O Equipment Co.  Smithfield Foods, Inc. 
A G C O Corp.  Tyson Foods, Inc. 
Ag Services of America, Inc.  United Heritage Corp. 
Caterpillar Tractor, Inc.  Rica Foods, Inc. 
Nacco Industries, Inc.  Kane Miller Corp. 
Allied Farm Equipment  Rath Packing Co. 
Syngenta Ag  Carnation Company 
DeKalb AgResearch, Inc./DeKalb Energy Co.  Dinner Bell Foods, Inc. 
Massey Ferguson Ltd./Varity Corp.  Wilson Foods Corp. 
Tennessee Gas Transmission Co./Tenneco, Inc.  Kaplan Industries 
Monsanto Co. New  General Host Corp. 
Deere & Co.  Thorn Apple Valley, Inc. 
Internat. Harvester Co./Navistar Internat. Corp.  Pierre Foods, Inc. 
Valmont Industries, Inc.  Sanderson Farms, Inc. 
Kubota Corp.  Provena Foods, Inc. 
Lindsay Manufacturing Co.  Central Soya, Inc. 
Fiat S P A  Ralston Purina Co. 
Gehl Company  P M Agri Nutrition Group Ltd./Virbac Corp. 
Alamo Group, Inc.  Conagra, Inc. 
Holland N V New/C N H Global N V  Corn Products International, Inc. 
Ingersoll Rand Co.  Beker Industries Corp. 
Tractor Supply Co.  Darling International 
Cadiz, Inc.  Bunge Ltd. 
N Viro Recovery, Inc./Synagro Technologies, Inc.  Archer Daniels Midland Co. 
Seminis, Inc.  Unilever N V 
Sylvan, Inc.  Zapata Corp. 
Terra Chemicals International, Inc.  Foodbrands America, Inc. 
Idle Wild Foods, Inc.  Andersons, Inc. 
Hyponex Corp.  Doughtie’s Foods, Inc. 
 
 Note: A complete list of the agribusiness firms used in the study is available from the authors upon 
 request. 